

Elected Bodies:
The Gender Quota Law
for Legislative Candidates in Mexico

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Abstract

In the past decade, twenty-two countries adopted gender quota laws that require between 20% and 50% of all legislative candidates to be women. What explains the adoption of these laws? This analysis argues that three factors make politicians more likely to adopt gender quota laws. First, a contagion effect links voluntary quotas at the party level and national quota laws: parties or majority coalitions in congress support quota laws in order to disperse the electoral advantage (or disadvantage) that individual parties might gain from them. The prospects for party quotas to diffuse to the national level depend on political context. Second, non-electoral branches of government support quotas as a way to demonstrate their autonomy from other branches, in the context of efforts to establish separation of powers. Finally, cross-partisan mobilization among female legislators raises the costs of opposing such legislation by drawing public attention to it. I examine these three claims with regard to Mexico, where the federal congress passed a 30% gender quota law in 2002.

“I’d give up my seat for you if it wasn’t for the fact that I’m sitting in it myself.”
—Groucho Marx¹

“[Many Latin American countries] have ‘homosexual’ political systems, that is the power of the political parties and the state is in the hands of only one of the sexes . . .”
—Line Bareiro, Paraguayan feminist²

The participation of women in politics has become an increasingly salient issue in recent years. Countries throughout the world have pursued a variety of ways to increase the number of women active in political life. One of the most popular measures to boost the presence of women in politics is the adoption of gender quotas. There are several different kinds of gender quotas. The most common are *party-level quotas*, which individual political parties adopt and implement on a purely voluntary basis. As of August 2003, 122 parties in 58 countries had some kind of quota provision in their internal statutes. Many people associate the high levels of female legislators in the Scandinavian countries with the quotas that leftist parties adopted there in the 1970s.

Next are *gender quota laws* for legislative candidates at the national level. Twenty-two countries have laws that require all political parties to nominate a minimum percentage of women as candidates for national legislative office. The level of the quota ranges from 20% to 50%. Argentina was the first country to adopt a gender quota law, in 1991. The Argentine law requires women to be at least 30% of candidates, and stipulates that at least one woman be placed in every third spot on the electoral lists. Argentina is the most dramatically successful case; after the law took effect, women’s share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies rose from an average of 4% to an average of 27% (Jones 1998). Worldwide, national gender quota laws generate an 8 percentage point increase in the number of women elected to parliament (Htun and Jones 2002).

Quota laws that apply to *subnational* elections constitute a third variation. Eight of the 10 countries that have subnational quota laws also have national laws, but Greece, Namibia and South Africa have quota laws that apply only to municipal elections. Finally, parliaments with *reserved seats* aside a certain percentage of seats for women rather than candidate positions. India adopted a policy of reserving one-third of the seats in its local governments for women, and 10 other countries have reserved seats at either the national or local level.³

[Insert Table 1 here]

The widespread adoption of these measures is puzzling because gender quotas appear to violate one of the most widely held assumptions about legislative behavior in political science—that elected officials seek to protect their positions. Even in countries where legislators cannot be reelected, holding office is a highly sought after prize, often critical to advancing one’s political career (Carey 1996). Why would predominantly male politicians adopt measures that would ostensibly limit their own chances to be nominated for political office, particularly in countries where traditional gender roles predominate? As one Uruguayan legislator stated during a debate on gender quotas, “We’re talking about giving up positions of power here, and nobody likes to give up power.”⁴

The growing literature on gender quotas tends to focus on either party or national quotas, but does not explain the conditions under which a country will adopt one or the other. I argue that three factors must be present in order for parties with voluntary quotas to support the adoption of national-level quota laws. First is a contagion effect in which parties or majority coalitions in congress attempt to neutralize the electoral advantages

gained by individual parties that have incorporated voluntary gender quotas into their party statutes.⁵ The impact of the contagion process depends on political context, specifically the degree to which candidate nomination procedures are institutionalized. The more uncertainty there is in the ways in which parties choose candidates, the more likely they are to adopt gender quota laws.

My second point is that the adoption of gender quotas is not purely an electoral story. Legislatures and presidents are not the only institutions relevant to the passage of quota laws. Courts have also played an important role because the most powerful argument against gender quota laws is that they violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection under the law. Efforts to establish separation of powers, particularly in Latin America amid the process of democratic consolidation, have made courts important players in policy debates. Changes in the relative autonomy of the main branches of government provide an opportunity for both advocates and opponents of quota laws to press their demands, given the centrality of the question of equal protection to the issue. In the wake of democratic transitions throughout Latin America, members of the judiciary, in particular, have sought to establish legitimacy by signaling their autonomy from other political leaders to the public at large. Judges may use women's rights issues, including gender quota laws, to demonstrate their independence. This provides an opportunity for quota law supporters to pit the various branches of government against one another in order to gain leverage on behalf of their desired policy outcomes.

Finally, cross-partisan mobilization by women plays an important role in quota law passage (Jaquette 1997; Jones 1996; Krook 2001). Because of widespread patterns of exclusion, female politicians from parties across the political spectrum have an interest

in greater access to positions of power.⁶ A shared condition of systematic exclusion from candidate slots can facilitate the formation of a strong, well-organized lobbying campaign on behalf of women from all the major parties. Cross-partisan coalitions of female politicians who can credibly threaten to denounce their male colleagues as sexist for opposing quotas represent a powerful pro-quota force. Such a coalition can force legislators to adopt a variation of the “blame avoidance” described by Kent Weaver (1988): politicians adopt a particular measure not to claim credit for it, but in order to avoid being punished for failing to adopt it.

I examine these claims with regard to Mexico, a country whose notoriety for *machismo* makes it an unlikely candidate for the adoption of gender quotas. Furthermore, the prospects for passing an *effective* quota law, or any women’s rights legislation for that matter, did not seem promising after the victory of Vicente Fox of the center-right National Action Party (PAN) in the 2000 presidential election (Stevenson 2001; Lamas 2002). Given the conservative stance on women’s issues among most of the male leaders in the PAN and the party’s classical liberal orientation, it seemed highly unlikely that PAN legislators would support a bill strengthening affirmative action measures for women.

In Mexico, the adoption of voluntary quotas at the party level was followed by the adoption of a much stricter quota law at the national level. Two of the three main political parties (and several of the minor ones) adopted voluntary, party-level quotas in the early 1990s. The Mexican Congress followed suit by passing a relatively weak quota law in 1996, which “recommended” that no more than 70% of the candidates for parliamentary office be women. The law proved ineffectual because it permitted the

parties to comply by nominating women to alternate spots (*suplentes*) and did not stipulate a placement mandate, which meant that women could be clustered in unelectable spots at the bottom of a list.

On April 30, 2002, the Mexican Congress passed a much stricter version of the law that applies to the main candidates (*propietarios*), not to the alternates. Mexico has a mixed electoral system in which 300 deputies are elected by plurality vote in single-member districts and 200 deputies are elected by a proportional representation system in 5 districts of 40 candidates each. The new reform requires that no more than 70% of the candidates for single-member districts be of the same gender.⁷ In the proportional representation lists, women must hold at least one of every three spots. The sanctions for noncompliance are strict: if a party submits a list that does not adhere to these rules, it has 48 hours to correct the problem. If after 48 hours the party has still not complied, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) will issue a public reprimand (*amonestación pública*) against the party. If after another 24 hours the party does not correct the problem, that party cannot submit any candidates for the district in question. The law does not apply to candidates for single-member districts who are chosen by means of direct election. In Mexico as in many other countries, the quota law passed with a nearly unanimous vote. The new quota law was implemented for the first time in the mid-term legislative elections held July 6, 2003.

This paper examines how this surprising outcome transpired. How did a strong, enforceable gender quota law pass in Mexico—with strong support—despite these apparently unpropitious conditions? My answer to this question draws from interviews conducted with male and female leaders of the three major parties (PRI, PAN and PRD)

during fieldwork trips to Mexico City in July 2002 and May 2003, analysis of party documents, accounts of the issue in Mexico's leading newspapers (El Universal, La Reforma and La Jornada), as well as reports from cimacnoticias.com, an online agency for news about women.

Existing Arguments

The existing literature offers a series of arguments that have been offered to explain the adoption of gender quota laws, based on changes in international norms, political culture, mobilization and electoral considerations.

International Factors. The United Nations Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which 168 countries have signed, stresses the importance of women's participation in political decision-making and calls for the adoption of "temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women."⁸ The promotion of women in decision-making positions figured prominently in the Platform for Action developed at the United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). Beijing in particular legitimated the issue of women's representation, helped establish new international norms regarding women's rights, and gave transnational activists in many countries the tools they needed to pressure for quotas at home (Htun and Jones 2002; Lubertino 1992; Meier 2000b; Stevenson 2000). As Kathleen Bruhn (2003) points out, Beijing did not necessarily set the quota law adoption process in motion; two of the main political parties in Mexico adopted quotas before 1995. But international conferences help explain why certain countries moved from party-level to national quota laws. They demonstrated that women's exclusion from candidate slots was a widespread phenomenon, raising legislators' consciousness and

facilitating cooperation among legislators from different parties. Nonetheless, international influences led to reform in some countries but not all, making them a necessary but not sufficient explanation for quota law adoption.

Political Culture. Some argue that gender quota laws tend to be implemented in countries characterized by egalitarian political cultures (Bystydzienski 1995; Inhetveen 1999; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Squires 1996). In Belgium, for example, Meier (2000a) argues that politicians adopted gender quota laws with relatively little debate because they were consistent with a political culture premised on consociational notions of group representation. Latin America also has a strong tradition of group rights, based on a corporatist model of sectoral interests (Wiarda 2001). In one sense, gender quotas represent the extension and formalization of a fundamental part of Mexican political culture.

Nonetheless, the extension of group rights to women remains surprising given Mexico's legendary culture of *machismo*—yet recent public opinion polls suggest that culture has diminished. Recent survey data has revealed widespread support for women's rights and women's participation in politics, especially among young people. In a 1996 Gallup poll (co-sponsored by the Inter-American Dialogue), 55% of Mexicans surveyed agreed that “this country would be governed better if more women were in political office” and 56% said that a presidential candidate's opinion regarding women's issues would be very important to them. Even more significant are the answers to a question specifically about quotas. The relevant question read, “As you may already know, women must comprise 30 percent of political party candidates in general elections. What is your general opinion of this quota for women—do you think it is mostly good for the

country or do you think it is mostly bad for the country?” Among Mexicans, 67% of men and 68% of women replied “mostly good.”⁹

Mobilization. Pressure exerted on legislators by women’s organizations and female party leaders represents a third category of explanation for the adoption of gender quota laws. Quota laws are more likely to be adopted in response to popular mobilization by women’s organizations. Several studies have pointed to mobilization on behalf of women by groups outside the party system as critical to the adoption of gender quotas—in Europe (Krook 2001), in Latin America (Htun and Jones 2002; Jones 1996; Schmidt 2001; Stevenson 2001) and elsewhere (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Jaquette 1997). Pressure exerted by female party leaders inside the political system is also relevant. Women in political parties are particularly skilled in how to mobilize voters in support of their cause, and well equipped to do so. Some studies show that the adoption of *party-level* quotas is in part a function of the presence of women in party leadership; the higher the percentage of women in leadership posts within a party, the more likely that party will adopt voluntary candidate quotas (Caul 2001; Short 1996). Their chances for success improve when they frame their arguments in terms of women’s exclusion from the political process (Jenson and Valiente 2003; Krook 2001).

Electoral Concerns. A fourth set of explanations relies on a straightforward electoral story: male politicians vote for gender quotas in an effort to win female votes in elections where the outcome is uncertain and when gender quotas are perceived as salient to a constituency whose votes may be pivotal (Howard-Merriam 1990; Htun and Jones 2002; Matland and Studlar 1996). Politicians adopt gender quota laws for eminently

pragmatic reasons, particularly to boost their support among women and close the gender gap (Allwood 1995; Allwood and Wadia 2000; Costain 1992; Costain N.D.; Stevenson 2001). This view makes sense given that women make up the majority of the electorate in many countries and female voters may constitute an important set of swing voters in close elections. From this perspective, gender quotas allow politicians to exploit a gender gap in voter support and claim credit with their female constituents (Mayhew 1974). Gender gaps in voting translate into behavioral change only if political entrepreneurs use them as leverage for their concerns. Mueller (1988) argues that politicians in the U.S. did not respond to a gender gap in voting behavior until women's organizations brought it to the attention of the public (see also Matland and Studlar 1996).

I argue that Mexican parties adopted a quota law not to claim credit with voters, but to avoid blame. This argument diverges from the conclusion drawn by Kathleen Bruhn (2003), that electoral considerations did not shape the decision of Mexican parties to adopt gender quotas, but is consistent with evidence she provides. Bruhn reports that few people knew about them and the parties made little effort to publicize them once they were adopted. When faced with voting on quota legislation, party leaders would have preferred not to approve it but did not want to be perceived as opposing it given high levels of public support.

The Contagion Effect

Richard Matland and Donley Studlar (1996) describe a process of contagion that explains the diffusion of voluntary quotas across political parties: "as smaller but competitive parties, usually on the political fringe, start to promote women actively, larger parties will move to emulate them." Other parties follow suit when they see they

electoral advantages reaped by the innovating party, either to neutralize those advantages or to capitalize on them. I adapt this argument to explain why legislators from parties that have already adopted voluntary quotas would support an effort to adopt a quota *law* that covers all political parties. Matland and Studlar focus on the impact of quota adoption on *voters*, presuming that the adoption of voluntary quotas elicits increased support among female voters. However, the impact that quota laws have on voters is indirect at best given the numerous factors that voters might consider in any given election. Quota laws have a much more direct effect on female politicians. Women in the parties support gender quotas to increase their chances for being nominated for run for office, and to advance their own political careers. The contagion effect can occur even if quota laws *have no effect* on a party's electoral fortunes; it can spread as women from other parties demand them. As I will show, the success or extent of the contagion process also depends on the political context of a particular case.

In Mexico, the contagion process started out as Matland and Studlar predict it would: a small leftist party adopted a voluntary gender quota provision. The PRI responded to the PRD's efforts because of pressure exerted by increasingly powerful women within the party, in the context of electoral competition and the introduction of electoral uncertainty. The contagion process did not extend to the PAN, a party with few women in positions of leadership (until recently) and a stable, institutionalized process of candidate nominations.

The adoption of a gender quota law, and the relationship between party level and national level quotas, must be understood within the context of conflicts regarding candidate nomination procedures within the long-time ruling party, the PRI. Opposition

parties have long existed in Mexico, but PRI control over resources and the rules of the game sharply curtailed their ability to influence policy. Growing dissent over time prompted the PRI to adopt a series of electoral reforms that increased the possibilities for opposition parties to compete. In the 1988 election, the PRI faced its first significant electoral challenge when Cuahtemoc Cardenas, a former scion of the PRI and leader of the dissident Democratic Convergence coalition, came close to beating PRI candidate Carlos Salinas. Widespread accusations of fraud damaged the legitimacy of the one-party state. The PRI suffered losses in Congress as well, for the first time in its history failing to secure the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution.

These setbacks set the stage for reform of the party's candidate selection procedures. Until 1988, the president of the PRI effectively controlled nominations of candidates for all levels of political office (Casar 2002). The PRI organized its members according to three sectors: peasants, workers and popular organizations. Traditionally, the party allocated nominations for legislative office through informal quotas allocated across these organizations. Party leaders selected candidates according to their ability to mobilize voters in their particular sectors. This practice, known as filling "quotas of power" (*cuotas de poder*), corresponded to corporatist entities, not to identity-based groups (Langston 1998). As other parties begin winning elections, the PRI could no longer guarantee the spoils of office to loyal activists. This prompted a series of efforts to reform the process and intense factional conflicts within the party. As Joy Langston {, 2003 #908, 295} writes, "Without a single acknowledged leader capable of enforcing agreements, the PRI had no acceptable method of internal negotiation over candidacies and leadership aside from factional infighting."

In the wake of his defeat in the 1988 election, losing presidential candidate Cuahetemoc Cardenas formed a new party, the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), made up largely of leftists who defected from the PRI. Many PRD members left the PRI out of frustration for being passed over in the candidate nomination process, so—not surprisingly—internal democratization became a particularly salient issue for the new party, one of its “fundamental political principles” (Bruhn 1997, 171). The PRD’s commitment to internal democracy represented an effort to separate itself from “the PRI’s history of authoritarian decision-making and quotas of influence” (Bruhn 1997, 171).

Despite its ostensible antipathy for quotas, the PRD was the first party in Mexico to adopt a voluntary gender quota. In 1990, the PRD passed a 20% quota for women in leadership positions, an effort led by female party leaders Rosario Robles and Amalia García (Stevenson 2000, 207). The representation of women on the PRD lists in the 1991 congressional elections was extremely poor. In terms of the number of female candidates it nominated, “the PRD, with perhaps the most democratic internal procedures of any party, came in dead last,” tenth out of ten parties competing in the election.¹⁰ This outcome prompted Robles and Garcia to redouble their efforts at the 1993 party congress. They persuaded the party to apply the 20% quota to candidate lists for the PR spots for federal and state-level elections, a resolution that the party voted to approve by a narrow margin (Stevenson 2000, 210).

Shortly afterwards, the PRI countered with a legislative measure to increase women’s participation. On September 11, 1993, the PRI-dominated congress amended the electoral law to read: “The political parties will promote, in terms determined by their internal statutes, greater participation of women in the political life of the country by way

of their nomination for popularly elected positions.”¹¹ This law did not stipulate a formal quota and included no enforcement mechanism, but the timing of its adoption makes it plausible to interpret it as an effort to respond to the PRD’s 20% quota.

In 1993, the PRD upped the ante by adopting a 30% quota for internal and legislative candidates, which stipulated that one of every three candidates be of a different gender. The party nominated more female candidates in 1994 elections than it had in 1991, but still fell short of its own quota, with women holding approximately 25% of all nominations (Bruhn 1997, 180).

In the PRI, meanwhile, a series of crises that occurred in 1994 further enhanced the ability of groups within the party to reform the statutes regarding candidate selection (Langston 2001). The Chiapas rebellion and the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio threw the party into chaos. At its January 1996 convention, under the leadership of María Elena Chapa, the PRI approved a recommendation to field no more than 70% of candidates of the same gender on its electoral lists. This measure did not require that the quota be implemented and contained no enforcement mechanism (Stevenson 1999). In November 1996, the PRI-dominated Congress wrote this measure into law. It amended Article 1 of the electoral law to read: “the political parties will consider in their statutes that the candidates for deputy and senator will not exceed 70% for the same gender. They will also promote greater political participation for women.” This law encouraged parties to nominate a certain percentage of women as candidates, but did not require them to do so, and it did not prevent parties from naming women to alternate positions, a practice known as putting women in as “filling” (*mujeres de rellena*). The parties adhered to the quotas in a minimalist way, interpreting the “no more

than 70%” clause as a ceiling of 30% for women, and taking advantage of Mexican’s system of electing two candidates for every legislative seat—a *propietario* and an alternate, called the *suplente*—to minimize the impact of the change. Women were overwhelmingly nominated to positions as *suplentes* rather than *propietarios*.

It is implausible to argue that the PRI adopted these reforms in order to close a gender gap. The party had always enjoyed strong support among female voters.¹² What had changed was the power of women in the party; during this period, women rose to prominent leadership positions within the PRI. Beatriz Paredes became head of the peasants’ sector, and Elba Ester Gordillo, former head of the powerful teachers’ union, led the popular sector (Rodríguez 1998, 14). María de los Angeles Moreno became president of the Senate in 1997, and President Zedillo appointed several women to his cabinet. Thus, women had an unusually high profile in the party leadership of the PRI.

Women also ascended to key leadership positions in the PRD: Rosario Robles was the mayor of Mexico City, and Amalia García was elected president of the PRD on the eve of the 2000 elections. In the PRD National Congress held April 2001, these two women led an effort to raise the level of their party’s gender quota to 50%. The measure failed due to opposition from a left-wing faction within the party. In this case, a leftist group opposed gender quotas in the name of decentralization and internal party democracy. The faction blocked parity and several other proposals that would have increased the power of the central leadership over candidate nominations. One of the proposals they blocked would allowed the central committee to nominate closed lists of candidates for plurality seats, which would have made it easier to implement the 50% parity requirement (La Jornada 2001). The parity measure failed, so the 30% party-level

quota remains on the books for the PRD; currently, the party statutes require that neither gender may hold more than 70% of the plurinominal candidate spots or leadership posts.¹³ Nonetheless, the PRD's failure to enforce these rules fueled support for a national law with tougher enforcement mechanisms.¹⁴

At the PRI's National Assembly six months later, in November 2001, quota advocates succeeded where the PRD had failed. The party adopted a parity measure that requires women to hold 50% of the party's candidates and leadership posts. At the beginning of 2002, quota law advocates had three allies in positions of considerable power in the PRI: the president and vice-president of the party and the President of the Congress. Elba Ester Gordillo was elected as the PRI's vice-president, on a ticket with Madrazo. Beatriz Paredes went on to become elected President of the Mesa Directiva of the Congress, the committee that sets the legislative agenda.

In this context of increasing electoral competition, the third major party resisted efforts to adopt voluntary quotas. The National Action Party (PAN) formed in 1939 as a conservative Catholic party. Its traditional base of support comes from the pro-clerical south and fiscally conservative business sectors from the urban north. The party has an impressive history of "firsts" with regard to women, but its recent efforts to promote women's rights have been ambivalent at best. The party firmly opposes efforts to legalize abortion, and its stances on other issues often reveals splits between progressive and conservative sectors. The other parties have made women's rights a salient issue in their competition with the PAN, frequently accusing the party of espousing retrograde attitudes with regard to women.¹⁵ The PAN resisted all efforts to adopt gender quotas until 1999, on the grounds that quotas were at odds with the party's classic liberal

ideology and incompatible with the party's candidate nomination procedures. In comparison to the practices of its competitors, the PAN's nominating process looks democratic; party members vote among slates of candidates in district-level elections. However, the fact that party leaders carefully select which party members attend the nominating conventions tends to predetermine the outcome. The PAN was able to resist the gender quota contagion until 1999 because the party's nominating rules remained stable throughout this period, and few women held leadership spots. In June 1999, the PAN change its statutes in order to comply with the gender quota provision of the electoral law and (in September 1999) agreed that each set of *propietarios* and *suplentes* for the proportional representation lists would include a woman and a man.

The process of contagion spread from 1990 to 1999, but it appeared to have little effect. Despite a decade's worth of efforts to increase women's representation, the percentage of women elected to Congress *decreased* in the 2000 election. One additional woman entered the Senate, but the percentage of women elected to the House of Deputies dropped from 17.4% in 1997 to 16.8% in 2000 (the level rose later when several male deputies stepped down from their posts and female *suplentes* took their place). This reversal challenged assumptions that the election of women would continue to increase over time, a realization that prompted feminist legislators to redouble their efforts to pass an enforceable gender quota law at the national level. According to María Elena Chapa, feminists throughout the region realized that "in all the countries of Latin America, the number of women [elected] was dropping each election. We had 93 female deputies, and now [as of 2002] we have 82. In all these countries, why was the number of women

falling, if we had been fighting for this for so many years?"¹⁶ Awareness of a broader pattern of decline fueled efforts to adopt quotas at home.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

By the middle of 2001, each of the three main parties—the PRI, the PRD and the PAN—had adopted some kind of quota provision for women in its internal party statutes, but their interests relative to a *national-level law* differed significantly. Female leaders of the PRI and the PRD supported a quota law as a way to ensure that gender quotas would be enforced. Many male PRI leaders supported the law because it would reduce the candidate quota from 50% to 30%. High-ranking PAN officials vehemently opposed a quota law. How did quota supporters manage to overcome the PAN's resistance?

The Role of the Supreme Court in the Quota Debate

While changes in internal party rules are part of the story, non-elective branches of government can also play an important role in the adoption of gender quota laws. In Mexico, quota law opponents took the issue to the courts, claiming that gender quotas were unconstitutional on the grounds of equal protection. The Mexican Supreme Court upheld this challenge to the quota law provision of a state-level electoral law, a decision that undermined the opposition to quotas and proved critical in the effort to pass a national law.

On November 16, 2001, the state legislature of Coahuila passed a gender quota law as part of a set of reforms to the state's electoral law. Coahuila is one of thirteen Mexican states have added quota provisions to their electoral laws, all in the past three years (since 2000).¹⁷ The Coahuila law requires the parties to promote gender equity, and establishes a quota of no more than 70% of either gender for candidates for the single-

member district deputy spots.¹⁸ On December 10, 2001, the National Action Party filed an action of unconstitutionality against the law, claiming that “to establish a fixed, maximum percentage of one gender constitutes a failure to consider the principle of equality” on the basis of Article Four of the Mexican Constitution (2002).¹⁹ Filing constitutional claims against quota laws is not unprecedented; courts found gender quota laws unconstitutional France in 1982 and in Italy in 1993. The strategic considerations behind the PAN’s decision to file this claim are unclear, although it is likely that the PAN viewed the gender quota provision as giving an electoral advantage to the PRI, the PAN’s main competitor in Coahuila. Moreover, the application of the gender quota to single-member district elections a significant constraint on candidate nominations, greater than it would have for multi-member districts. Regardless, the move clearly indicates strong opposition to gender quotas on the part of the PAN’s top national-level leadership.

One month later, on January 11, 2002, the PAN leadership tried to retract the case from the Supreme Court docket, acting under pressure from women in the party and negative publicity from other women’s groups. In a press release, the party affirmed: “we have conducted a scrupulous analysis that leads us to conclude that the claim under consideration is out of step with the actions that the party has been taking over the past few years to actively promote the participation of women in national political life and in the party” (Nunez 2002).

The Supreme Court balked at this maneuver. The justice in charge of the case, Sergio Salvador Aguirre Anguiano, rejected the PAN’s efforts to remove the case from consideration, stating “one cannot take a step backwards in terms of litigation; once presented before the Court, the tribunal must consider the case and determine whether the

reforms in question are constitutional or not.” His words testify to the Court’s efforts to establish its legitimacy in Mexican politics: “It is not possible to comply with this request because it would negate the powers that the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court, and because determining whether the articles in question are or are not constitutional, is a question that requires a thorough study of the topic,” he affirmed (Fuentes 2002a).²⁰ Aguirre’s assertion of judicial independence is particularly striking given that he is the only *panista* minister on the court.

On February 20, 2002, the Supreme Court announced that it had voted to uphold the gender quota stipulated by the Coahuila electoral law, by a vote of 8 to 2. Leading newspapers reported that the Court “set a precedent in electoral law” with this decision (El Universal 2002). Speaking on behalf of the majority, Minister Guillermo Ortiz Mayagoitia, stated: “the Coahuila law is directed toward the political parties, not at the citizens, and therefore does not create any inequality among them” (Fuentes 2002b). This statement suggests that the Court’s decision rested on the principle that political parties have a different juridical status than individual citizens, and that constitutional protections for individual equality do not extend to political parties. The Court maintained that the Coahuila law “did not violate the principle of equality between men and women, given that if a party or coalition exceeds the percentage, the only consequence would be that the first spot on the proportional representation list would be granted to someone from the underrepresented gender.” The majority ruling further affirmed the principle of group representation, arguing that “democracy as it is understood in the Constitution ‘consists in giving opportunity to the presence of underrepresented minorities’” (Fuentes 2002b).²¹

The motivations for the Supreme Court decision in the Coahuila case are two-fold. The justices acted in part out of genuine support for a progressive agenda on women's rights, as it had with regard to the "Ley Robles," a controversial law that liberalized abortion in Mexico City.²² Moreover, Supreme Court justice Olga Sanchez Cordero played an important role in influencing the perspectives of her male colleagues in both the Robles and Coahuila decisions.²³

The Court was also motivated by a desire to demonstrate its independence from the executive branch, whose preferences it challenged in both the quota and abortion cases, consistent with the interpretation offered by Jeff Staton (2002). The media's treatment of the Coahuila gender quota decision lends support to the proposition that the case is relevant to the Court's standing in public opinion and to perceptions that it is institutionally autonomous. For example, the two dissenting justices in the Coahuila decision (Juan Silva Meza and Humberto Román Palacios) became associated with their opposition to the quota provision in the media, even in stories unrelated to the case.²⁴ A feature story on the Supreme Court lists the Coahuila case as one of 9 controversial cases that demonstrate the "pioneering role" of the Court (Pastrana 2002).

While additional research on judicial decision-making is needed to understand the basis for the Court's decision more fully, the decision on the Coahuila case proved critical for the passage of a national-level quota law. PRI Deputy María Elena Chapa, a long-time supporter of quotas, maintained that the decision "paved the way" for the passage of the quota law because it "cancelled out" the arguments of those who claimed that gender quotas are unconstitutional (Maya 2002).²⁵ Interviews with deputies from the PAN and the PRD confirmed this.²⁶

Cross-partisan Mobilization

Two weeks after the Coahuila decision, quota advocates in Congress moved to bring the quota issue onto the floor. On March 8, International Women's Day, PRI leader and President of the Executive Committee of Congress Beatriz Paredes convened two committees (Governance, and Gender and Equity) and instructed them to bring a gender quota bill before Congress by April 18 (Gonzalez 2002).

The quota issue divided PAN leaders. PAN president Luis Felipe Bravo Mena (who brought the Supreme Court case against the Coahuila law in the first place) opposed the law. Many Mexicans associated the PAN's view of quotas with a colorful statement that PAN leader Diego Fernandez de Cevallos made at a conference of female *panistas* held on March 16, 2002. He was quoted as having said, "Do I believe in quotas? Frankly, no, because if we start with quotas, we would also have to look for, all of a sudden, *las cuotas para los jotos*" (Salazar and Barajas 2002). *Jotos* is a Mexican slang term for homosexuals. But prominent female leaders in the PAN broke ranks with their male colleagues in order to support the bill (Gonzalez 2002).

A united front among women from all the parties proved critical in persuading their male colleagues to support the bill. Women from across the main parties had cooperated on several other women's rights issues in the 1990s, including laws penalizing sexual violence and domestic violence (Bruhn 2003; Stevenson 2000). As María Elena Chapa recalled,

We have worked as a plurality, a step that we learned in 1998, when female legislators from all the parties sat down together to put our causes that we had to resolve above our party ideologies. Together we passed the Law Against Assault and Sexual Harassment in 1990, later—also working together—we won the approval of the Belen de Para Convention regarding domestic violence, the Law

Against Domestic Violence, the National Women's Institute and of course now the quotas, affirmative action."²⁷

PAN Deputy Gabriela Cuevas initially opposed it on the grounds that it discriminated against women and stigmatized women by not allowing them to participate on the basis of merit—but she became convinced that it was necessary after learning more about it from members of the Gender and Equity Committee.²⁸ Like other skeptics, she became convinced that there was no other way to increase the number of women elected (Bruhn 2003).

The real power behind women's ability to unite across partisan lines lay in the lobbying strategy they used with their male colleagues. They predicted that male politicians would be more receptive to arguments made by a woman from another party.

According to Chapa:

We strategically divided the negotiation among ourselves. It is more difficult for our male colleagues to say no, when it is women from other parties who sit down with them to convince them [of a particular position]. It was an organized campaign, and there was much less resistance. To one's own female colleagues, it is much easier to say 'here come those annoying women [*esas latosas*] again.' If a woman from another party comes, well then they refrain from making a judgment. In all the parties, they are immersed in a culture that we cannot ignore, regarding our male colleagues.²⁹

PAN leader Germán Martínez confirmed this point: "It's one thing to confront the women in your own party. But when you are up against women from the other parties, it's difficult to say no."³⁰ Ironically, women relied on traditional gender roles—in this case men's gentlemanly deference toward women—to persuade them to support a measure whose aim was to undo traditional gender roles.

Another factor that proved critical to the passage of this law was women's ability to focus public attention on the issue. The political entrepreneurship of Patricia Espinosa,

PAN leader and Director of the National Women's Institute, is particularly noteworthy in this respect. One of principle resources of the National Women's Institute is to harness the national media through the purchase of paid government advertising, an action Espinosa took at critical points in the legislative process. One example appeared on February 12, 2002, a week before the Supreme Court issued its decision on the Coahuila case. Espinosa published a statement titled "Quotas are Necessary to Guarantee the Participation of Women in the Political Parties" in all three main national newspapers (*El Universal*, *Reforma* and *La Jornada*). Using government resources to pay for these ads allowed the Women's Institute to circumvent the competition for media coverage and avoid uncertainty over the substantive content of media coverage.³¹ By doing so, Espinosa took an internal party struggle into the public arena, expanding the scope of conflict and opening the doors of the smoky back rooms to let in the light of public attention. Her ability to build a constituency of support around women's rights issues gave her some autonomy and leverage within her party.

The pro-quota coalition was so confident were they in public support for the quotas that they included "public censure" as a punishment for failure to comply. The law punishes parties with a public reprimand if they fail to comply, a provision that many quota supporters considered to be the most powerful component of the law. As PRD Deputy Hortensia Aragón affirmed, "We went directly to the public reprimand (*amonestación pública*) followed by the cancellation of the party's registry. We didn't want to fine them or reduce their [campaign finance subsidy] . . . no, no, no, no, the issue of gender is not a question of pesos and centavos."³² PAN legislators preferred fines rather than a public reprimand, which suggests that they too considered financial

punishment less costly (in electoral terms) than being portrayed as opposing women's issues in the midst of an election (La Reforma 2002; Salazar 2002)). As PAN leader Margarita Zavala stated in an interview, the party could not afford the negative publicity that would have arisen from a vote against the quota law: "We do not have the money to counteract the impact that voting against the quota would have in the media; this is what finally convinced the last holdouts, that we would have to explain why we voted as we did."³³ A PRD deputy who spoke on the condition of anonymity said "if we achieve nothing more than that the public reprimand be a reprimand with all the weight from all the media . . . that would be enough. Because that is the moment at which the parties are calling for women first and foremost to vote for them."³⁴ This deputy's desire to remain off the record with regard to this statement further attests to the salience of this issue, as well as her expectations that the reprimand would prove to be an important issue in the implementation of the law—expectations that, it turned out, were not realized in the election.

Women's lobbying efforts succeeded. One PAN leader confided that the party supported the bill for "pragmatic reasons, rather than out of conviction" and "for fear of the electoral consequences." He became convinced that "the other parties would jump on the opportunity to show that the PAN was against women," and added that "we supported quotas because we did not want to put at risk all the other programs we have created for women."³⁵ The results of the survey conducted by the Inter-American Dialogue and Gallup also influenced the PAN's decision to support a national-level quota law.³⁶

While PAN leaders ultimately supported the bill, they sought to include amendments that would weaken its impact. The PAN sought to eliminate the placement

mandate, so that the quota could be counted as a percentage of all the lists considered together, rather a percentage of spots on each individual list. It succeeded in adding a clause that parties who chose candidates via direct election (primaries) should be exempt from applying the quota.³⁷ At the time the bill was under discussion, quota supporters did not believe this would be a significant issue. They were not worried because they did not consider any of the parties to hold *legitimately* direct elections, and they believed the Federal Electoral Institute would support this interpretation.³⁸

Men in the PRI supported the effort to pass a national quota enthusiastically. All three proposals represented a smaller quota than the 50-50 rule recently adopted by the PRI. As PRI Deputy María Elena Chapa stated in an interview, male deputies from the PRI “thought it was a *very good* idea to pass [the quota law] because it was less than what the party statutes required.”³⁹ PRI Deputy Concepción Gonzalez confirmed this point, stating that “the men in the PRI were really scared by the parity provision. When the proposal was introduced, they said, sure, yes, let’s approve the law, of course I’ll sign it!”⁴⁰

In the end, the bill passed by a vote of 403 in favor, 7 against and 12 abstentions. All of the bill’s opponents, and all but one of the abstainers, were male PAN deputies. On May 1, the Senate approved the measure by a unanimous vote. Once the bill passed, the party issued statements that celebrated the new law and described it as consistent with the PAN’s history of being a leader in terms of incorporating women into political life. *Reforma* reported that “the PAN took advantage of this opportunity” to remind people that the first woman to run for governor, the first female mayor, and the first woman to be

a member of the Executive Committee of a party were all members of the PAN (Nunez 2002; Salazar and Barajas 2002).

Implementation of the New Law

The law was implemented for the first time in the mid-term legislative elections for the Chamber of Deputies held on July 6, 2003. In the vast majority of cases, the parties complied fully with the law. As IFE Councillor Jacqueline Peschard stated in an interview, the parties complied fully, “even overcomplied . . . because the penalty [for failing to comply] was so severe.”⁴¹ As Figure 2 shows, all of the parties surpassed the 30% threshold for both the single-member district and proportional representation districts. The parties far surpassed the quota in the PR seats, with an average of XX% across all the lists.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

While technically the parties did comply with the law, they made ample use of the clause that exempts parties that choose their candidates by “direct election” from fulfilling the quotas. This proved critical in the 300 single-member districts. Overall, of across all of the 12 parties/coalitions competing in this election, the majority of candidates were designated by party leaders—78%—and a minority were chosen in “direct elections”—22%. Within the three major parties, however, just under half of the candidates were chosen in direct elections and slightly more than half were designated by party leaders (49.4% and 50.6% respectively). In other words, *the quota law applied to only half of the candidate slots for the three major parties*. For the PRI, the quota law applied to only a tiny minority of districts: 6 out of 300. The PAN applied the quota to half of its districts, and the PRD applied it to 85% of its districts. Figure 3 compares the

percentage of women nominated in the districts to which the quota applied, to the percentage of women nominated across all districts, broken down by party.

It is questionable how direct most of the candidate elections really were. The law does not define what constitutes “direct” and the IFE offered no guidelines as to what did and did not count as legitimately direct elections. One of the IFE Councilors acknowledged this explicitly in a general assembly on April 18, 2003, the day the parties submitted their lists of single-member district candidates: “the Federal Electoral Institute accepts the claims of the political parties [regarding whether the elections they held were direct or not] as truthful and valid, inasmuch as they are institutions of good faith, whose affirmations must be taken as legitimate, unless proven otherwise.”⁴²

Despite these exemptions, women won 23% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, up from 16% in the previous legislature. These results catapulted Mexico from #55 in the world ranking of women in legislative office to #23, a spot it now shares with Switzerland (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2003). The 7% increase that occurred in Mexico is just one point below the average increase that quota laws generate (Htun and Jones 2002).

Conclusion

Gender quota laws are increasingly prominent landmarks on the electoral map, particularly in places one might not expect to find them. This examination of the Mexican case highlights three factors that contributed to the adoption of a gender quota law in 2002: first, a political context of electoral uncertainty that opened up the possibilities for reform of the rules by which parties selected their candidates; second, a shifting balance

of power among political institutions that has accompanied the consolidation of democracy in Mexico; and third, consensus among female leaders in various parties in support of gender quotas, coupled with the creative use of resources at their disposal.

The Mexican case demonstrates that, while electoral concerns are part of the story, non-elective branches of government have also played important roles in the adoption of gender quota laws. What about the counterfactual? Would the electoral reform have passed without the Supreme Court's favorable decision?⁴³ Perhaps. Yet the Coahuila decision significantly reduced the bargaining power of PAN leaders opposed to the reform. The Court decision obviated objections that gender quotas violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection. If, on the other hand, the Court had decided *against* the Coahuila gender quota, the federal law would definitely not have passed, and both the Coahuila law and other state quotas would likely have been struck down. The Court's willingness to challenge the executive on this issue proved critical to passing the law. More research on judicial behavior, particularly cross-national research, will help to determine the conditions under which courts are more or less likely to adjudicate on behalf of organized interests. Courts have struck down quota laws in Italy, France, and Colombia.⁴⁴ The key point is that courts should not be ignored in explaining policy outcomes in this area.

Shared experiences of being shut out from candidate slots precipitated the formation of a coalition of women across party lines. Women capitalized on their common interests and mobilized widespread public support for quotas to persuade reluctant male colleagues to support the adoption of the quota law. Public support for women's rights issues, and the inclusion of women in political decision-making

positions, is sufficiently high that politicians consider it unacceptable to oppose issues framed in terms of women's rights. This in itself is an important point that indicates that a significant change in gender norms has occurred. Women expected public pressure to be a powerful tool to ensure full compliance with the law. The parties ultimately followed the law, but not because they feared public admonition. The possibility of being denied the right to nominate any candidates for office, a threat backed by the powerfully autonomous Federal Electoral Institute, proved sufficiently great to ensure full compliance—while at the same time encouraging many of the larger parties to limit the number of districts in which they had to comply. The degree to which parties chose candidates by direct election and thus avoided the quota did not appear in media coverage of the election. Yet the quota law had a significant impact in Mexico despite these limitations.

Table 1. Gender Quota Laws for Legislative Candidates at the National Level

Country	Quota	Year Adopted
Argentina	30%, every 3 rd spot	1991
Armenia	5% of PR lists	1999
Belgium	No more than 2/3 of same sex; top 3 cannot be of same sex	1994, 2002
Bolivia	30% in Chamber, 25% in Senate, for safe seats; increases 5% each election until 50% reached	1997
Bosnia/Herzegovina	1/3	1998
Brazil	30% of	1995, 1997
Costa Rica	40% of electable seats	1996
Dominican Republic	25%	1997
Ecuador	20% of PR seats	1997
France	50%	1999
Guyana	33%	1996
Indonesia	30%	2003
Macedonia	30%	??
Morocco	30 of 325 are filled from women-only lists	??
Mexico	30% of single-member districts; one of every 3 spots for PR lists	2002
Nepal	5% of Chamber candidates; 3 seats in Upper House	1990
Panama	30% of Chamber candidates	1997
Paraguay	20%	1996
Peru	30%	1997, 2001
Philippines	Women must be included on lists	1995
Serbia and Montenegro	30% for Serbian Chamber candidates; no quota for Montenegro	2002
Venezuela	30%	1998

Source: IDEA Quota Database <http://www.idea.int/quota/index.cfm>


Figure 1. Women in Mexican Chamber of Deputies



Figure 2. Quota Law Compliance.

Figure 3. % Women in Applicable Districts vs. All Districts

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¹ Quoted in Lesley Abdela, “Women Lose Ground,” *The Guardian Unlimited*, May 8, 2001. Accessed May 15, 2002; [<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4182250,00.html>].

² Line Bareiro and Clyde Soto, eds, *Sola No Basta: mecanismos para mejorar la participación política de las mujeres*. Asunción, Paraguay: Centro de Documentación y Estudios Area Mujer and Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1992, p. 11.

³ For the complete list of countries, see the Quota database <http://www.idea.int/quota/index.cfm>.

⁴ Gobbi, Carina. 1996. Reforma de la constitución: una propuesta para la democracia completa: fempress.

⁵ I borrow the term “contagion effect” from {Matland, 1996 #711}.

⁶ I develop this argument about women’s shared interest in political inclusion in Baldez, Lisa. 2002. *Why Women Protest: Women’s Movements in Chile*. New York: Cambridge University Press..

⁷ The text of the law is available at http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/dof/dof_24-06-2002.pdf.

⁸ The full text of Article 4 of CEDAW reads: “Article 4. 1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. Available at <http://www.un.org/unifem/cedaw...>

⁹ Poll results reported in {Inter-American Dialogue, 1997 #910}

¹⁰ On the other hand, the PRI had no internal elections but still nominated very few female candidates. The number of women nominated by the PRI put it in ninth place Bruhn, Kathleen. 1997. *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press..

¹¹ Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales, Article 175, Paragraph 3.

¹² For polling data, see Domínguez, Jorge I., and James McCann. 1996. *Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral Choices*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. [Camp, page 67].

¹³ The party also has quotas for young people and indigenous people: the statutes require that one in every five plurinominal candidates be filled by someone less than thirty years old, and that indigenous people hold a percentage of seats proportional to their share of the population in each electoral district. The party statutes are available at www.prd.org.

¹⁴ “Las impugnaciones contra el PRD,” *La Jornada*, September 19, 2002: www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/sep01/010919/oriente-edit.html.

¹⁵ See, for example, “Exigen que el PAN retire propaganda que atenta contra la mujer en Michoacan” *La Jornada*, October 24, 2002, www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/oct01/011024/045n2est.html.

¹⁶ Interview, Mexico City, 2002.

¹⁷ The 13 states are Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Distrito Federal, Durango, Estado de Mexico, Oaxaca, Queretaro, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tabasco. For a list of the Mexican states with quota provisions, go to <http://www.laneta.apc.org/genero/cuotas.html>. Quota bills are on the agenda in several other states and some states have nominal gender provisions that lack enforcement mechanisms Milenio. 2002. *Un voto por la equidad*. [cited.. The electoral law in Aguascalientes, for example, states simply that “political parties will seek greater participation among women and youth in popularly-elected positions.” See Código Electoral del Estado de Aguascalientes, Article 15. Available at <http://www.congresoags.gob.mx/>.

¹⁸ The text of the Coahuila electoral law is available at http://www.congresocoahuila.gob.mx/index.cfm/mod.legislacion_archivo/dir.LeyesEstatalesVigentes/index_coah.

¹⁹ An action of unconstitutionality is a form of judicial review of the constitutionality of state and federal laws. See Staton, Jeffrey K. 2002. “Judicial Activism and Public Authority Compliance: The Role of Public Support in the Mexican Separation of Powers System, Department of Political Science, Washington University., especially Chapter 4.

²⁰ “No ha lugar proveer de conformidad con su solicitud, pues se haría nugatoria la facultad que la Constitución confiere a esta Suprema Corte de Justicia, y porque la determinación de considerar si los articulos a que hace alusión son o no constitucionales, es una cuestión que atane al estudio de fondo del asunto.”

²¹ This logic has not extended to issues regarding the representation of indigenous people. President Fox initiated a law based on the San Andres Accords signed by the government and the Zapatistas, which would

modify the Constitution to give ethnic groups greater autonomy regarding local government, customs and land. Congress approved the law, but it was then sent (by whom?) to the Supreme Court for review. The Court decided against the law, declaring 321 constitutional controversies *improcedentes* [??].

²² The law is named for its sponsor, PRD Deputy Rosario Robles. A group of 22 deputies from the Mexico City Congress (17 from the PAN and 5 from the Green-Ecology Party) submitted an “action of unconstitutionality” against the law, claiming that it violated constitutional guarantees of the “right to life from conception” El Universal. 2002. *A mujeres, 30 por ciento de candidaturas*. [cited November 26, 2002]. Available from www.el-universal.com.mx. On January 28, 2002, the newspaper *Universal* ran a front-page story announcing that the Supreme Court was about to issue its decision on the case. The fact that this article appeared on the front page testifies to its importance. The Supreme Court upheld the law, or—more precisely—failed to overturn it, by a vote of six to five. The majority opposed the constitutionality of the law, but did not win the eight votes required to declare the law unconstitutional. The President of the Supreme Court and member of the minority in this decision, Genaro Góngora Pimentel, celebrated the decision by saying “What a good thing for the good of women!” (*que bien por el bien de las mujeres!*) Aviles, Carlos. 2002. *Avalan que MP autorice el aborto por violación*. El Universal [cited November 26, 2002]. Available from www.el-universal.com.mx. Deputy Robles, commenting on the decision, emphasized the partisan conflicts behind the abortion issue and pointed to the divisions between the President and the Supreme Court Saul Rodriguez, Lilia. 2002. *Entre musica y risas festejan mujeres fallo sobre el aborto*. El Universal [cited November 26, 2002]. Available from www.el-universal.com.mx.

²³ Interview with Marta Laura Carranza Aguayo and Roberto Ortiz Vega, INAMU, Mexico City, July 18, 2002.

²⁴ An article about the Supreme Court justices published in *La Jornada*, May 5, 2002, identifies a photo of Justice Silva Meza with the caption “Against the Quotas.” A three-paragraph biography of him begins with a discussion of his stance on the Coahuila case Pastrana, Daniela. 2002. *La corte manda*. Jornada [cited November 26, 2002]. Available from www.jornada.unam.mx/2002/may02/020505/mas-corte.html.

²⁵ Interview, Mexico City, July 17, 2002.

²⁶ Interviews, Mexico City, July 16, 2002.

²⁷ Interview, Mexico City, July 16, 2002.

²⁸ Interview, Mexico City, July 18, 2002.

²⁹ Interview, Mexico City, July 16, 2002.

³⁰ Interview, Mexico City, July 18, 2002.

³¹ Unfortunately, ads are not available on the online editions of most newspapers.

³² Interview, Mexico City, July 15, 2002.

³³ Interview, Mexico City, May 27, 2003.

³⁴ Interview, Mexico City, July 16, 2002.

³⁵ Interview, Mexico City, July 18, 2002.

³⁶ Interview with German Martinez, Mexico City, July 18, 2002.

³⁷ Interview, Mexico City, July 18, 2002

³⁸ Interview with Hortensia Aragon, Mexico City, July 2002.

³⁹ Interview, Mexico City, July 17, 2002.

⁴⁰ Interview, Mexico City, date.

⁴¹ Interview, Mexico City, May XX, 2003.

⁴² {Instituto Federal Electoral, 2003 #906}.

⁴³ I thank Andy Sobel for posing this question to me.

⁴⁴ The French case was in 1982. Recently the courts upheld the 1999 gender parity law.